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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries of issues 
of first impression identified by federal court of appeals opinions 
announced between August 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016.  This 
collection, written by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is 
organized by circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the issue, not a 
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 13 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2017). 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers, 844 F.3d 358 (1st Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant who overpaid a damages award 
may offset the overpayment and sue for the sum in an independent action.  
Id. at 359. 
ANALYSIS: The court relied on a 5th Circuit decision, which held 
that “once a shipowner pays maintenance and cure to the injured seaman, 
the payments can be recovered only by offset against the seaman’s 
damages award — not by an independent suit seeking affirmative 
recovery.” Id. at 366 (internal citations omitted).  The court believed that 
this decision struck the proper balance between “protecting seamen in the 
wake of debilitating on-the-job injury and ensuring that shipowners can 
protect themselves from liability for sums attributable to concealed 
preexisting injuries.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: Defendant could not seek affirmative recovery of 
maintenance and cure payments that it had already made, however, they 
could offset the overpayment against any damages awarded to plaintiff at 
trial.  Id. at 362. 
 
Sampson v. United States, 832 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the 
government, at [a defendant’s] new [death] penalty phase hearing, from 
seeking to prove two non-statutory aggravating factors which the jury at 
[the defendant’s] first [death] penalty phase hearing found had not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 42. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “the touchstone for double-
jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has 
been an ‘acquittal.’”  Id. at 44.  The court noted that “an ‘acquittal’ in the 
capital sentencing context turns on ‘whether the sentencer or reviewing 
court has ‘decided that the prosecution has not proved its case’ that the 
death penalty is appropriate.’”  Id.  The court further reasoned that the 
jury’s decision at the penalty-phase of defendant’s first trial is not an 
‘acquittal’ because “the jury found the death penalty justified, despite also 
finding that the government had not proven two non-statutory aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt to all members of the jury.”  Id.  The 
court also noted that collateral estoppel, which is embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment protection against double jeopardy, “does not bar the 
introduction[,] at a second penalty-phase proceeding[,] of non-statutory 
aggravating factors presented to, and not found proven by, an earlier 
penalty-phase jury” because the two non-statutory factors “were not 
necessary to [the defendant’s] death sentence.”  Id. at 47. 
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CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not bar the government from alleging those non-statutory 
aggravating factors again at [a defendant’s] new [death] penalty-phase 
proceeding.”  Id. at 49. 
 
United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether – or under what circumstances – a high-
ranking employee of a government contractor can be said to occupy a 
position of trust vis-à-vis a defrauded government entity.”  Id. at 67. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the D.C., 2nd, 
and 4th Circuits “have recognized that a defendant can be found to have 
occupied (and abused) a position of trust vis-à-vis the government when 
he misuses public funds through a combination of control over a 
government contractor and a lack of government oversight.”  Id.  The court 
reasoned that “a government agency sometimes may rely too heavily on a 
high-ranking employee of a contractor and thereby place that individual in 
a position of special trust.”  Id.  As such, both substantial control and 
significant discretion over the affairs of the government contractor must 
be established to warrant the application of the position-of-trust 
enhancement.  Id. 
CONCLUSION:  The defendant occupied a position of trust because 
he dominated the corporation and managed the use of public funds with a 
lack of meaningful government oversight from the governmental 
authority.  Id. at 69. 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
B.C. v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an individual with a ‘disability’ under the 
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)] categorically 
qualifies as an individual with a ‘disability’ under the [Americans with 
Disabilities Act] and Section 504” of the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 155. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit noted that because Section 504 expressly 
incorporates the ADA’s definition of disability, it would refer to both 
statutes as the ADA.  Id. at 159 n.4.  The court reasoned that a disability 
under the ADA is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities,” while a disability under the IDEA 
includes intellectual, hearing, speech or language impairments, among 
others, that require “special education or related services.”  Id. at 162 n.7 
(internal citations omitted).  The court focused on the language 
“substantially limits” and reasoned that under the IDEA, a child might 
require special education services because of an intellectual impairment, 
but that impairment may not necessarily “substantially limit” a “major life 
246 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:243 
activity,” as required by the ADA.  Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted).  
The court reasoned that the ADA and IDEA present distinct legal 
standards, and therefore, “an individual will not qualify for the ADA’s 
protections simply by virtue of his or her disabled status under the IDEA.”  
Id. at 160. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that an “individual with a 
‘disability’ under the IDEA [does not] categorically qualif[y] as an 
individual with a ‘disability’ under the ADA and Section 504.”  Id. at 155. 
 
Ferrari v. Cnty. Of Suffolk, 845 F.3d 46 (2nd Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the Due Process Clause permits a county that 
presented evidence of a driver’s history of intoxicated or reckless driving 
at a retention hearing, to “then shift the burden of going forward onto the 
owner-driver to point to a specific alternative measure that he is willing 
and able to sustain that might satisfy the County’s interest, and to 
demonstrate that such alternative measure would be feasible for the driver 
to accomplish.”  Id. at 64. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[i]n assessing whether a 
particular allocation of burdens comports with the Due Process Clause, 
[the court must] look to the three-factor balancing test articulated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge.”  Id.  The court noted that “[t]he test weighs: (1) the 
private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation though the 
procedures used and the value of other safeguards and (3) the 
government’s interests.”  Id. at 65.  The court reasoned that an automobile 
“owner may have an important interest in retaining the use of a motor 
vehicle pendente lite” through its use as a mode of transportation, means 
to earn a livelihood, and obtaining an education.  Id.  The court further 
noted that “an individual may also have a financial interest in a vehicle 
apart from its use by the owner himself.”  Id.  The court reasoned, however, 
that although “the private interest in retaining access to a particular vehicle 
pendente lite is strong, the private interest in affording claimants the 
specific procedure demanded by [this claimant]—namely, that the County 
bear the burden of disproving the feasibility of alternative measure . . . —
is weak” because this burden “does not greatly add to the protection 
already afforded such owners pursuant to the [County’s] existing 
procedures” and “could have the effect of delaying these hearings, which 
would arguably be detrimental to the interest not only of innocent owners, 
but title owners more generally.”  Id. at 65–66. 
The court further noted that “the County’s practice of shifting the 
burden of going forward onto a title owner to articulate the case for an 
alternative measure does not have any material effect on that owner’s 
interest” because before the hearings in this County, “title owners receive 
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notice as to the question that will be discussed, including the availability 
of alternative measures” and the relevant evidence “is generally uniquely 
within the purview of the title owner, who can thus be expected to gather 
it without difficulty.”  Id. at 66.  The court further reasoned that, in 
retaining the vehicle pendente lite, the County had a financial interest in 
the vehicle and a particularly strong “interest in protecting the public from 
use of the vehicle ‘as an instrumentality in future acts of driving while 
intoxicated.’”  Id. at 67. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that that “in weighing the 
private interest, the risk of error, and the County’s interest, . . . it does not 
violate the Due Process Clause for [the County], after establishing a prima 
facie case that retention may be necessary to protect the County’s interests 
in the financial value of the vehicle or in protecting the public from 
repeated unsafe driving, to shift the burden of going forward to the title 
owner to point to an alternative measure that he is willing and able to 
sustain that might satisfy the County’s interests and to demonstrate, at least 
as an initial matter, that such alternative measure would be feasible for 
him.”  Id. at 68. 
 
Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210 (2d. Cir. 2016) 
  QUESTION ONE: “Whether a sentence of conditional discharge and 
one day’s community service, unfulfilled as of the time of filing the habeas 
petition, satisfies the ‘in custody’ requirement of § 2254.”  Id. at 213. 
  ANALYSIS: The court stated that the custody analysis “requires a 
court to judge the ‘severity’ of an actual or potential restraint on liberty.”  
Id. at 216.  The court also noted that other courts had considered “restraints 
on liberty that might appear short in duration” to be sufficiently severe as 
“they required petitioners to appear in certain places at certain times,” 
which restricted the freedom of movement available to the public.  Id.  The 
court thus reasoned that because the restrictions required Nowakowski’s 
physical presence at particular times and locations and carried potential of 
adverse consequences for non-cooperation, that he was in fact “in custody” 
pursuant to § 2254.  Id. at 217. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that Nowakowski’s sentence 
falls within the category of restraints that satisfy the statutory requirement 
of custody. Id. at 217. 
QUESTION TWO: “Whether a presumption of continuing collateral 
consequences applies to Nowakowski’s conviction, thus presenting a live 
case of controversy under Art. III despite the expiration of the sentence.”  
Id. at 213. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined the two-step analysis 
from Spencer to examine if the presumption of continuing collateral 
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consequences applies and existed in our case.  Id. at 218.  The court 
determined that the presumption of continuing collateral consequences 
applied in this case because Nowakowski’s conviction is criminal in nature 
for the purposes of invoking the presumption, which only extends to 
criminal cases.  Id. at 222.  The court found that the presumption existed 
because of the possibility that Nowakowski could be impeached in a future 
proceeding with this information, which was a sufficient collateral 
consequence of the conviction.  Id. at 225. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that Nowakowski’s conviction 
is criminal for the purposes of the conviction and that he sufficiently 
identified a continuing collateral consequence of the conviction.  Id. at 
228. 
 
United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether 21 U.S.C. § 959(b) applies extraterritorially to 
acts of possession with intent to distribute.  Id. at 162. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 5th Circuit has concluded that 
§ 959(b) extends extraterritorially to acts of possession with intent to 
distribute.  Id. at n.7.  The court reasoned that the statute’s text and 
structure lends itself to various interpretations.  Id. at 163–65.  The court 
reasoned that limiting the statute to domestic acts “would have the peculiar 
effect of establishing a purely domestic crime within a statute aimed at 
combatting international narcotics smuggling and importation where 
every other provision applies extraterritorially.”  Id. at 164.  Furthermore, 
“reading § 959(b)(2) to proscribe only domestic conduct would render it a 
redundancy within the federal statutory framework.”  Id.  Finally, the court 
noted that the legislative history “strongly confirms our reading of the 
statute’s text and structure.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the structure, context, and 
authoritative history of the statute reveal Congress’s clear intent that the 
statute apply extraterritorially in its entirety.”  Id. at 166. 
 
United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d. Cir. 2016) 
  QUESTION: “[W]hether Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of 
violence under the force clause.”  Id. at 140. 
  ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit previously stated that conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the Bail Reform 
Act.  Id.  The risk-of-force clause, codified at 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(c)(3)(B), 
defines a crime of violence as any felony that “has an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another.”  Id.  The court noted that the Supreme Court had 
previously held that “physical force encompasses even its indirect 
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application.”  Id. at 143.  Further, the court found the 9th Circuit’s holding 
that Hobbs Act robbery “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” 
persuasive.  Id. at 144. 
CONCLUSION: Hobbs Act robbery “has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the “disqualification of counsel on the basis of 
a conflict of interest pos[es] a potential harm to a nonparty non-witness.”  
Id. at 238. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit addressed this question by determining 
whether “there [was] a substantial relationship between the subject matter 
of the counsel’s prior representation of the moving party and the issues in 
the present lawsuit.”  Id. at 239.  The 2nd Circuit reasoned that the district 
court erred in classifying the individual as a “mere spectator to this 
litigation.”  Id. at 240.  Rather, the court classified the individual as a 
“putative victim.”  Id.  Because “crime victims, as well as witnesses, 
possess legitimate interests in criminal proceedings,” disqualification of 
counsel may be proper.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the risk of prosecution for 
a nonparty, non-witness, “based on the potential disclosure of confidential 
information obtained during a prior representation,” ultimately outweighs 
any inconvenience for a defendant to obtain new counsel.  Id. at 242. 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether, in applying the “first-filed” rule, a district 
court’s decision to dismiss the second-filed action with prejudice was an 
abuse of discretion.  Id. at 216. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit began by noting that the first-filed rule 
gives district courts several options with respect to the second-filed action: 
stay, transfer, dismissal without prejudice or dismissal with prejudice.  Id. 
at 210.  The court examined multiple treatises, finding that they reflect the 
“commonsense proposition” that where the timeliness of a case is at issue 
in the first-filed action, such as a statute of limitations expiration, dismissal 
with prejudice could “have the effect of putting the plaintiffs entirely out 
of court.”  Id. at 217.  The court then noted that the 5th, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits have respectively found that the more appropriate use of 
discretion afforded by the first-filed rule would be to stay or transfer the 
second-filed action.  Id.  Relying on this line of case law, the court 
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reasoned that district courts should take care so as to avoid causing undue 
prejudice to litigants, which could result where a dismissal would prevent 
the merits of the claim from ever being heard.  Id. at 218–19.  Finally, the 
court explained that both the Supreme Court’s abstention doctrine, as well 
as its own, support issuing a stay under the first-filed rule, in order to avoid 
“abdication” of a court’s duty to exercise its jurisdiction and decide cases.  
Id. at 220. 
CONCLUSION: Adopting the jurisprudence of the 5th, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits, the 3rd Circuit held that “in the vast majority of cases, a court 
exercising its discretion under the first-filed rule should stay or transfer a 
second filed suit,” concluding that “a dismissal with prejudice will almost 
always be an abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 220–21. 
 
Didon v. Castillo, 838 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “[M]ay a child have two ‘habitual residence’ countries 
at the same time under the Hague Convention (‘concurrent habitual 
residence’)?”  Id. at 316. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that the Convention was 
unambiguous and repeatedly referenced “the State” of habitual residence.  
Id. at 322 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). The court 
looked to the ordinary meaning of “residence” to determine which country 
was the “habitual residence.”  Id. at 316.  The court noted that determining 
a habitual residence is a fact-intensive inquiry in which factors such as the 
child’s physical presence, the child’s routine, the child’s connections with 
people and places, and parents’ “present, shared intentions regarding their 
child’s presence[.]”  Id. at 326 (internal citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that under the Hague 
Convention, a child may not have two habitual resident countries.  Id. at 
316. 
 
Mack v. Loretto, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION ONE: “Whether an inmate’s oral grievance to prison 
officials can constitute protected activity under the Constitution.”  Id. at 
291. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit began by noting that the First 
Amendment right to petition and right to free speech protects both written 
and oral forms of expression.  Id. at 297–98.  The court further clarified 
that an individual’s prisoner status does not preclude the protection of an 
oral grievance to prison officials under the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment, so long as the right being exercised is not “incompatible with 
[the individual’s] status as a prisoner.”  Id. at 298.  Finally, adopting the 
rationale of the 7th Circuit—the only other circuit to have addressed the 
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issue—the court determined that the right to petition for redress of 
grievances does not depend on the form in which the grievance takes, such 
as an oral, rather than written complaint.  Id. at 299. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a prisoner’s oral grievance 
is protected activity under the First Amendment.  Id. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether the Religious Freedom and Restoration 
Act (RFRA) “prohibits individual conduct that substantially burdens 
religious exercise.”  Id. at 291. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit first examined the plain language of 
RFRA, which states that “Government” includes “a branch, department, 
agency, instrumentality, and official or other person acting under color of 
law.”  Id. at 301.  The court interpreted this language to mean that the 
statute is not limited to only those actions taken by officials or other 
persons acting under the color of law that are “in furtherance of an official 
policy,” but rather that RFRA prohibits “almost every” official action 
taken by any official of the Government, as the Supreme Court has 
previously determined.  Id.  The court further reasoned that the similarities 
between the definition of “Government” under RFRA and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983—the latter imposing liability for individual conduct of “state 
officials or private persons acting under the color of law”—presumes that 
Congress intended for RFRA to be similarly construed.  Id. at 302. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that RFRA prohibits the burden 
of religious exercise through “individual government conduct whether or 
not it is undertaken pursuant to an official rule or policy.”  Id. 
QUESTION THREE: “Whether RFRA provides monetary relief from 
an official sued in his individual capacity.”  Id. at 291. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted at the outset that although RFRA 
indicates that plaintiffs may obtain “appropriate relief,” the statute does 
not define the meaning of this term.  Id. at 302.  As a result, the court 
turned to the “traditional presumption” of the term’s meaning, articulated 
by the Supreme Court, which indicates that “absent clear direction to the 
contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any 
appropriate relief . . . brought pursuant to a federal statute.”  Id. at 303 
(internal quotations omitted).  The court justified its application of this 
presumption to RFRA on the basis that both the Supreme Court and the 
statute refer to the identical language, that Congress was aware of the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court at the time of RFRA’s enactment, and 
that RFRA was intended to provide “broad religious liberty protections.”  
Id.  Similar to its analysis of the scope of RFRA’s protections, the court 
also found persuasive the similarities between RFRA and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which provides monetary relief for the individual conduct of state 
officials.  Id.  Finally, the court distinguished RFRA from its sister statute, 
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 
which has been construed as not providing monetary relief for individual 
conduct, as the two statutes were enacted pursuant to different 
congressional powers, the former the Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
latter, the Spending Clause.  Id. at 303–04. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that “federal officers who 
violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity for damages.”  Id. 
at 304. 
 
Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether [a State University] is an arm of the State of 
New Jersey, which would render it immune from the discrimination suit 
brought by [an ex-employee].”  Id. at 81. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by reasoning that the 
Eleventh Amendment “has [been] interpreted . . . to bar suits against a 
State by its own citizens—not just those from other jurisdictions.”  Id. at 
83 (internal citations omitted).  In addition, the court noted that the 
Amendment bars not only suits against States themselves, but also suits 
for damages against “arms of the State”—entities that, by their very nature, 
are so intertwined with the State that any suit against them renders the 
State the “real, substantial party in interest.”  Id.  The court then opined 
that the three factor Fitchik test is to apply to determine “whether a state-
affiliated entity is an ‘arm of the State’ that falls within the ambit of 
the Eleventh Amendment.”  Id. (citing Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989)).  The court reasoned 
that while the “funding factor weighs against immunity, . . . its status 
under state law and autonomy factors both favor immunity.”  Id. at 99. 
CONCLUSION: The State University is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment protection.  Id. 
 
United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether social media chat logs can be introduced and 
properly authenticated under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) since 
the exact author cannot be determined.  Id. at 405. 
ANALYSIS: The analysis of the court proceeds in two steps as to 
proper authentication of social media.  Id.  The court must analyze whether 
the communications at issue are business records that may be “self-
authenticated” by way of certificate from custodian under FRE 902(11) 
and whether the Government nonetheless provided sufficient evidence to 
authenticate the records under FRE 901.  Id.  First, the court decided that 
the recording of social media chat logs by the host website are not records 
of regularly conducted activity subject to the self-authentication rule 
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governing business records.  Id. at 410.  Second, the court reasoned that 
evidence arising from social media records might be authenticated by 
extrinsic evidence in the same way as documentary evidence.  Id. at 412.  
As such, it is no less proper to consider a wide range of evidence for the 
authentication of social media records than it is for more traditional 
documentary evidence.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that although the exact author of a 
social media chat cannot be determined, social media chat logs could be 
introduced as evidence if the authentication can be proven by a veritable 
mountain of evidence linking the person in question to the statements 
made in the chat.  Id. at 415. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Batato, 833 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 
(“CAFRA”) is unconstitutional as a deprivation of Due Process under the 
Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 426. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the Supreme Court had 
previously “struck a federal district court’s use of disentitlement to strike 
a civil forfeiture claimant’s defense.”  Id.  In that opinion, the Supreme 
Court left open the question of whether a statute that authorized such a 
practice would be constitutionally prohibited.  Id.  After that decision was 
rendered, Congress enacted CAFRA.  Id.  The court began its analysis by 
distinguishing the Supreme Court’s reasoning on the grounds that its 
opinion was mainly directed at the balance of power between the branches 
of government and the opinion signaled that the analysis might be different 
if the practice was contained within a statute.  Id. at 427.  The court stated 
that CAFRA did not eliminate the opportunity to be heard as the claimants 
could have secured a hearing at any time by entering the United States.  Id.  
The court also reasoned that “the refusal to face criminal charges that 
would determine whether or not the claimants came by the property at 
issue illegally supports a presumption that the property was, indeed, so 
obtained.”  Id.  The court further distinguished this case from the prior 
Supreme Court opinion by noting that “the property is located outside the 
United States, complicating jurisdiction and the district court’s ability to 
resolve” the issues in front of it.  Id. at 429.  As such, the court reasoned 
that “notions of due process are not so rigid that they cannot be adapted in 
light of a party’s clear intent to use procedural guarantees to avoid 
substantial justice.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: Since CAFRA “predicates disentitlement on an 
allowable presumption that a criminal fugitive lacks a meritorious defense 
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to a related civil forfeiture, . . . it does not violate the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Muldrow, 844 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court, in calculating the “applicable 
guideline range” at resentencing is bound by United States Sentencing 
Guideline Amendment 759.  Id. at 437. 
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit began by noting that if Amendment 
759—which revises the commentary to § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines 
regarding the calculation of the “applicable guideline range” for reducing 
a sentence—conflicts with the text of Guidelines, “[the commentary] 
cannot bind courts.”  Id. at 439.  The court then compared the language of 
the commentary to § 1B1.10 with Amendment 759’s definition of 
“applicable guideline range,” to the extent it permits consideration of a 
sentencing court’s departure or variance from a defendant’s criminal 
history occurring at the original sentencing, and failed to identify any 
inconsistences in the text.  Id. at 440.  The court determined that 
“Amendment 759’s clarifying definition is consistent with § 1B1.10,” in 
that Amendment 759 expressly limits the consideration of departure or 
variance only once the guideline range has been calculated, whereas the 
commentary to § 1B1.10 does not account for departures and variances.”  
Id.  The court further explained that although the application instructions 
of the Guidelines direct a judge to determine the defendant’s criminal 
history category, that a court is required to make this determination “does 
not give the judge a license to factor in a departure,” as a court “cannot 
factor in a departure from a [guideline] range before calculating the range 
itself.”  Id. at 441 (internal quotations omitted). The court also determined 
that Amendment 759 applied to a defendant’s resentencing, as it was 
enacted prior to the disposition of a motion for a sentence reduction, 
despite the fact that the edition of the Guidelines enacted at the time of the 
original sentence normally controls.  Id. at 441–42.  Finally, the court 
noted that the 2nd Circuit similarly concluded that the Sentencing 
Commission “foreclosed” potential inconsistencies between the 
Guidelines and the Amendment that would render a sentencing court not 
bound by the Amendment’s definition of the applicable guideline range.  
Id. at 442. 
CONCLUSION: Joining “all of [their] sister circuits that have 
considered the issue,” the 4th Circuit held that “Amendment 759 binds 
sentencing courts.”  Id. at 436. 
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United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether subpoenas issued to third parties pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) (“Rule 17(c)”) are subject only 
to the explicit standard of the rule—oppressive or unreasonable—or the 
higher standard articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon 
(“the Nixon Test”) in order to avoid being modified or quashed by the 
court.  Id. at 462–63. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the Nixon Test requires the 
requesting party to demonstrate “(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3) 
specificity.”  Id. at 462.  The court acknowledged that the Nixon Test could 
be read as applying only to subpoenas issued against the prosecution, but 
noted that the Supreme Court declined to answer that question.  Id.  The 
court then stated that the Nixon Test was not explicitly limited to requests 
from the government or prosecution.  Id. at 463.  Next, the court noted that 
the explicit requirements of Rule 17(c) were not incompatible with the 
requirements of the Nixon Test, stating that “[a] subpoena should be 
quashed as unreasonable or oppressive if it is ‘irrelevant; abusive or 
harassing; overly vague; or excessively broad.’”  Id.  Finally, the court 
noted that these Rule 17(c) requirements “map on quite well to 
the [Nixon] standard of relevance, admissibility, and specificity.”  Id.  
(internal citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The Nixon Test is the appropriate standard for Rule 
17(c) subpoenas requesting documents from third parties.  Id. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether discovery of U immigration visa records from 
individual claimants can be barred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(c) as imposing an undue burden.  Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court set out to determine the probative value of 
allowing U visa discovery in order to potentially show fraud and therefore 
impeach some of the plaintiff’s claims.  Id.  The court gave deference to 
the district court’s ruling that such discovery was relevant after failing to 
find an abuse of discretion on the district court’s behalf.  Id.  The court, 
however, then balanced the probative value with the issue of whether 
allowing such discovery would create an undue burden on plaintiffs 
because of the possibility that it would dissuade other plaintiffs from 
coming forward out of fear of losing their jobs or being reported.  Id.  The 
5th Circuit reasoned that “allowing such discovery of U visa information 
may have a chilling effect extending well beyond this case, imperiling 
important public purposes” and when weighed against the significant 
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interests of the defendant, the court found that the discovery would impose 
an undue burden.  Id. at 564. 
CONCLUSION:  “The statute bars discovery of U visa records from 
the EEOC, but it does not bar discovery of the records from the individual 
claimants.”  Id. at 554. 
 
Enable Miss. River Transmission, L.L.C. v. Nadel & Gussman, L.L.C., 
844 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the National Gas Act’s (“NGA”) exclusive 
jurisdiction provision extends to actions involving third party interference.  
Id. at 496. 
ANALYSIS: The court relied on the reasoning of the 6th and 9th 
Circuits.  Id. at 499–500. The 9th Circuit held that because a well-operator 
was not subject to any duties under the NGA, it could not violate the NGA 
and be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.  Id.  Similarly, the 6th 
Circuit reasoned that defendants must possess a statutory duty to violate 
the NGA.  Id. at 500–01.  The court reasoned that since the Defendant did 
not have any duties under the NGA or any applicable regulations, 
resolution of State law claims would not require the court “to determine 
whether the defendants [have] complied with rules that [have] the effect 
and force of federal law.”  Id. at 501 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The court declined to extend the federal exclusivity 
provision of the NGA to cover claims of interference against defendants 
who have no statutory duties under the Act.  Id. 
 
Lee v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 837 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: What is “the degree to which the impact of fiduciary 
misconduct must be realized . . . in order to establish [constitutional] 
standing” in an ERISA action brought by a participant in a defined-benefit 
plan?  Id. at 545. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit explained that “fiduciary misconduct in 
a defined-benefit plan ‘will not affect an individual’s entitlement to a 
defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire 
plan.’”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Because of this, the constitutional 
requirement under Article III for a particularized injury in fact “is 
attenuated as, prior to default under the plan, ‘the employer typically bears 
the entire investment risk and—short of the consequences of plan 
termination—must cover any underfunding as the result of a shortfall that 
may occur from the plan’s investments.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  The 5th 
Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit, stating, “fiduciary misconduct, 
standing alone without allegations of impact on individual benefits, is too 
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removed to establish the requisite injury.”  Id.  Without direct injury to the 
class representative, the 5th Circuit reasoned “that the allegations are 
insufficient to support the [constitutional] standing to assert this claim,” 
which was distinct from and could not be conferred by statutory standing 
alone.  Id. at 547. 
CONCLUSION: Imminent risk of default to an ERISA defined-benefit 
plan, such that the participant’s benefits are adversely affected, is required 
for the claimants to have constitutional standing when there is fiduciary 
misconduct by an employer managing an ERISA defined-benefit plan.  Id. 
at 546. 
 
United States v. Ayika, 837 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether any part of the [money] remaining in [a bank] 
account can be ‘traced,’ for the purposes of § 982(a)(7), [or alternatively, 
§ 853(p),] to [defendant’s] crime of conviction.”  Id. at 472. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that because “there were many 
deposits and withdrawals of both legitimately and fraudulently obtained 
funds over the life of the [bank] account . . . tracing the remaining funds 
under § 982(a)(7) . . . would be virtually impossible.”  Id. at 473.  The 
court further explained that since the Government provided evidence that 
only “33.55% of the funds deposited into the [bank] 
account . . . represented gross proceeds of the crime of conviction . . . the 
Government . . . failed to prove that it is, more likely than not, that the 
funds remaining in that account [were] traceable to [defendant’s] fraud[.]”  
Id. at 474.  The court then turned its attention to “another statutory 
provision asserted in the pleadings and orders below[]: 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853(p)” and clarified that “the Government cannot, consistent with the 
statutes, treat § 982(a)(7) and § 853(p) as interchangeable.”  Id. at 474–75. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “the funds deposited into the 
[bank] account over the life of the account, those that remain, and the 
assets purchased with funds therefrom, are not traceable to the crime of 
conviction and are hence not forfeitable under § 982(a)(7).”  Id. at 476.  
The court further held that only “when the Government makes a showing 
that the defendant commingled funds, both legal and fraudulent, which 
cannot be divided without difficulty, and consequently rendered 
forfeitable assets untraceable to the crime of conviction under § 982(a)(1), 
[then] the Government may turn to § 853(p).”  Id. at 476. 
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SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Berry v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 832 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the U.S. Department of Energy’s decision not 
to reopen a claim seeking compensation to a survivor of an employee 
covered under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 
Program Act (EEOICPA) is subject to judicial review.  Id. at 632. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the challenged action must be “made 
reviewable by statute” or be a “final agency action for which there is no 
other adequate remedy in court.”  Id. at 632.  The court examined whether 
the refusal to reopen constitutes a “final agency action” for judicial review.  
Id.  The court further noted that there is a distinction between requests to 
reopen based on new evidence and those based on material error for 
judicial review purposes.  Id. at 636. 
CONCLUSION:  The 6th Circuit held that the survivor’s request to 
reopen his claim based on a “purported material error in the Department’s 
original decision” was “‘committed to agency discretion’ and 
unreviewable under the APA.”  Id. at 639. 
 
Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether the killing of a dog constitutes ‘seizure’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at  566. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit explained that a “large number of this 
Court’s sister circuits have already concluded that, ‘the use of deadly force 
against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an [imminent] 
danger and the use of force is unavoidable.’” Id. (citations omitted) 
(parenthetical in original).  The 6th Circuit cites, with approval, precedent 
from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits, and adopts the same 
position, that the killing of a companion animal qualifies as an 
unconstitutional seizure.  Id.  The 6th Circuit identified that “every sister 
circuit that had confronted the issue concluded that an individual has a 
property right in their dog.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[T]here is a constitutional right under the Fourth 
Amendment to not have one’s dog unreasonably seized.”  Id. 
 
Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether ascertainability is a requirement for class 
certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).  Id. at 
541. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the 1st, 3rd, and 10th 
Circuits have held that ascertainability is inapplicable to Rule 23(b)(2).  Id.  
The court reasoned that (b)(2) class members are distinguishable from 
(b)(3) class members who are entitled to notice and are able to opt-out of 
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the class.  Id.  The court further noted that “the focus in a (b)(2) class is 
more heavily placed on the nature of the remedy sought, and because a 
remedy obtained by one member will naturally affect the others, the 
identities of individual class members are less critical in a (b)(2) action 
than in a (b)(3) action.”  Id. at 542. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit agreed with the other circuit courts 
and held that “ascertainability is not an additional requirement for 
certification of a (b)(2) class seeking only injunctive and declaratory 
relief.”  Id. 
 
Loffredo v. Daimler AG, 666 F. App’x 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA)] preempts a state-law antidiscrimination claim that is 
filed outside a corresponding federal law’s statute of limitations but within 
the state law’s longer statute of limitations, despite both state and federal 
law imposing liability for the same substantive conduct.”  Id. at 377. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit first noted that ERISA’s savings clause 
only saves state laws from preemption if their preemption would impair or 
modify federal law.  Id. at 378.  The court held that the preemption of the 
state law at issue here would not impair or modify its federal counterpart, 
thus the state law was not saved from ERISA preemption.  Id.  Particularly, 
“because the [federal law] would continue to ‘prohibit precisely the same 
employment practices, and be enforced in precisely the same manner,’” 
even if the state law claim was preempted, application of the ERISA 
savings clause was not warranted.  Id.  As such, the state law claim was 
preempted, and the only remaining federal claim therefore had to comply 
with a federal statute of limitations, not the longer state law statute of 
limitations.  Id.  Since the Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim was filed 
outside of the federal statute of limitations, yet within the state law statute 
of limitations, dismissal of the claim for untimely file was appropriate, the 
state law statute of limitations having been preempted.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “ERISA preempts 
Plaintiffs’ age-discrimination claim because it is untimely under the 
ADEA and preemption of Michigan’s statute of limitations neither impairs 
nor modifies federal law.”  Id. 
 
Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “intercept” as used in the Federal Wire 
Tap Act (“Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2511, requires that an acquisition of an 
electronic communication occur contemporaneously with the transmission 
of that communication.  Id. at 627. 
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that although “[t]he Act does not 
explicitly require that the acquisition of a communication occur 
contemporaneously with the transmission of the communication,” the 3rd, 
5th, 9th, and 11th Circuits have interpreted the Act’s language and “have 
uniformly concluded that an intercept requires contemporaneity.”  Id.  The 
court noted that the Act draws a distinction between “electronic 
communications” and “electronic storage.”  Id.  The court also noted that 
the Act defines the former as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or 
in part by wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system,” while the latter is defined as “(A) any temporary, intermediate 
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof . . . (B) any storage of such communication by an 
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of 
such communication.”  Id.  The court further reasoned that the term 
“intercept” only applies to “electronic communications,” but not to “the 
acquisition of electronic signals that are no longer being transferred.”  Id.  
The court also reasoned that “[o]nce the transmission of the 
communication has ended, the communication ceases to be a 
communication at all” and “becomes part of ‘electronic storage,’ which a 
person cannot ‘intercept.’”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit joined the 3rd, 5th, 9th, and 11th 
Circuits and held that “in order for an ‘intercept’ to occur for purposes of 
the Wiretap Act, the electronic communication at issue must be acquired 
contemporaneously with the transmission of that communication [before 
it becomes ‘electronic storage’].”  Id. at 629. 
 
Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether solicitation of prostitution is a crime of moral 
turpitude.  Id. at 559. 
ANALYSIS: The court applied the “‘categorical framework’ to 
determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude.”  Id.  Under this 
framework, the court determined not “whether the actual conduct 
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, but whether the full range 
of conduct encompassed by the statute constitutes a crime of moral 
turpitude.”  Id.  The court relied upon a decision of the 9th Circuit, which 
found that solicitation of prostitution was a crime of moral turpitude due 
to several decisions of the Board of Immigration Affairs that had ruled as 
such.  Id. at 560.  The court agreed with the 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits and 
held that the Bureau of Immigration Affairs’ reasonable interpretation of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act was entitled to Chevron deference.  
Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “[i]f the [Bureau of Immigration 
Affairs] considers prostitution to be a [crime involving moral turpitude], 
there is no reason to consider the solicitation of prostitution” not to be.  Id. 
 
United States v. Beckham, 838 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether Amendment 759 to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id. 
at 735. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that every circuit 
that had considered whether Amendment 759 to the U.S.S.G. violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause had rejected it.  Id. at 735. The court noted that the 
Ex Post Factor Clause “forbids a change in law that increases the 
potential punishment for past conduct.”  Id.  In this case, the court 
reasoned that Amendment 759 “simply restricts the district court’s 
discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to a future Guidelines 
amendment, which prisoners have no entitlement to.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original). As such, it did not present any Ex Post Facto Clause problems.  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a decision by the Sentencing 
Commission to limit the class of defendants who may benefit from a future 
amendment does not have any bearing on the Ex Post Facto Clause.”  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 
United States v. Bonds, 839 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(U.S.S.G.) Amendment 742, which includes a provision that required a 
two-point enhancement to a criminal defendant’s offense level, may be 
applied in conjunction with U.S.S.G. Amendment 782, a retroactive 
reduction to “the base offense levels for most drug-trafficking crimes,” for 
purposes of reducing a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).  Id. at 528. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the policy statement in U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.10 instructs a court to amend a defendant’s guideline range, and 
therefore reduce a term of imprisonment, “if the applicable guideline range 
has subsequently been lowered by one of the amendments named in 
subsection (d).”  Id. at 529.  The court noted that Amendment 782 was 
listed in subsection (d), but Amendment 742 was “notably absent.”  Id.  
The court reasoned that this was a “clear and unambiguous” direction that 
only the amendments listed in subsection (d) could be applied when 
reducing a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the retroactive “Amendment 
782 does not permit district courts to apply other non-retroactive 
amendments” to reduce a guidelines range.  Id. at 528–29. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Central States v. American International Group, Inc., 840 F.3d 448 (7th 
Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether a coordination of benefits disputes seeks 
appropriate equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  Id. at 449. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the 8th, 2nd, 
3rd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Circuits have already addressed this issue and all 
have held that the relief sought is legal, not equitable.  Id. at 452.  These 
Circuits based their reasoning of a series of Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the phrase “appropriate equitable relief.”  Id.  The Court, in 
those opinions, explained that whether a remedy is available “depends on 
(1) the basis for the plaintiff’s claim and (2) the nature of the underlying 
remedies sought.”  Id. at 453 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
Both must be equitable for a claim to proceed.  Id.  Importantly, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he remedy is properly regarded as 
equitable only if the plaintiff seeks the return of specifically identified 
funds that remain in the defendant’s possession or . . . traceable items that 
the defendant purchased with the funds.”  Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  The court noted that the trustee’s request for 
declaratory relief “requests money damages, the epitome of legal relief,” 
and as such his suit cannot proceed.  Id. at 454. 
CONCLUSION: The court joined the other circuits in holding that “the 
trustee’s suit against the insurers to recoup amounts it paid for the 
beneficiaries’ medical care seeks legal relief, not equitable relief, and as 
such is not authorized,” by ERISA.  Id. at 455. 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Belmont, 831 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the meaning of “engage in the business of” 
within 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (“the explosives statute”) requires a 
profit/livelihood motive, or if it merely requires a showing that one is 
actively buying, selling, and procuring explosives in commerce.   Id. at 
1100–1102. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the explosive statute makes it 
unlawful to “engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or 
dealing in explosive materials without a license issued under this chapter.”  
Id. at 1100 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks 
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omitted).  The court then considered Congress’s interpretation of “engage 
in the business of” under the Gun Control Act—which required a showing 
of profit or livelihood motive—but dismissed this interpretation as it was 
enacted to protect gun owning citizens’ Second Amendment rights.  Id.  at 
1101.  Next, the court considered the 10th Circuit’s interpretation of 
“engage in the business of” under the explosive statute, which only 
requires a showing that one is actively involved in buying or selling 
explosives in commerce.  Id.  The court noted that “the explosives statue 
defined ‘manufacture’ as ‘any person engaged in the business of 
manufacturing explosive materials for purposes of sale or distribution or 
for his own use.’” Id.  at 1102 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 841(h)). 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the explosive statute does 
not require a showing of profit or livelihood motive to show that one has 
engaged in business of manufacturing explosives.  Id. at 1102. 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 
2016) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federally recognized Indian tribe waives 
its sovereign immunity from suit by exercising its right to remove to 
federal court a case filed against it in state court [while promptly asserting 
its immunity defense].”  Id. at 1014. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[t]he doctrine of . . . sovereign 
immunity derives from the status of Indian tribes as ‘separate sovereigns 
preexisting the Constitution’” and the courts employ a “strong 
presumption against [its] waiver.”  Id. at 1016.  The court noted that a tribe 
“may lose its immunity from suit” through a congressional or personal 
waiver.  Id.  The court further reasoned that “a waiver of [tribal] sovereign 
immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed’” and 
that expression must “manifest the tribe’s intent to surrender immunity in 
‘clear’ and unmistakable terms.”  Id.  The court also noted that “[b]y filing 
a lawsuit, a tribe may . . . ’ consent to the court’s jurisdiction to determine 
the claims brought’ and thereby agree to be bound by the court decision 
on those claims.  Id. at 1017.  The court reasoned, however, that “[b]y 
consenting to the court’s jurisdiction to determine its own claims . . . a 
tribe does not automatically waive its immunity as to claims that could be 
asserted against it, even as to ‘related matters . . . aris[ing] from the same 
set of underlying facts.’”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that, “an Indian tribe’s removal 
of a case from state to federal court does not, in and of itself, effect a 
waiver of its tribal immunity.”  Id. at 1023–24. 
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Daniels v. MSPB, 832 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the Merit System Protection Board (“Board”) 
had jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s appeal alleging that he properly 
made a non-frivolous disclosure that was protected under the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).  Id. at 1054. 
ANALYSIS: The WPA was amended in 2012, allowing United States 
Court of Appeals to review Board decisions pertaining to individual right 
of action appeals.  Id. An aggrieved employee may seek recourse from the 
Board by filing an individual right of action (“IRA”).  Id. at 1051.  For the 
Board to have jurisdiction over such an appeal “the appellant . . . [must] 
make ‘non-frivolous allegations’ that (1) he engaged in whistleblowing 
activity by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 2302(b)(8) . . . .”  Id.  The court noted that “Congress explicitly stated 
that it only intended to protect disclosures of certain types of wrongdoing,” 
in passing the WPA.  Id. at 1055.  As such, the court did “not undermine 
congressional intent . . . [or] improperly limit the definition of ‘disclosure’ 
by concluding that an erroneous agency ruling or adjudication is not a 
violation of law for purposes of the WPA.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th  Circuit held that “[a]n agency ruling or 
adjudication, even if erroneous, is not the type of ‘wrongdoing’ 
contemplated by the WPA.”  Id. at 1055–56. 
 
Helping Hand Tools v. United States EPA, 836 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the “[Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
is] required to consider solar power and a greater natural gas mix as clean 
fuel control technologies in [best available control technology (BACT)] 
analysis.”  Id. at 1005. 
ANALYSIS: The court took into consideration the availability of 
control alternatives in a BACT analysis, but hesitated to require the 
consideration of control alternatives that would redefine the source—
alternatives that would require a complete redesign of the facility.  Id. at 
1006. The court explained that the Defendant properly defined the project 
and rejected control technologies that redefined the project with thoughtful 
and rational explanations and was consistent with the EPA’s prior 
guidance.  Id. at 1012–13.  Furthermore, because of the complicity 
surrounding the analysis of the environmental effect of different biomass 
fuels in the ever-developing field of climate-change science, the court 
deferred to Defendant’s expertise when the record showed that its 
endeavors were reasonable.  Id. at 1013. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the EPA is not required to 
consider solar power and a greater natural gas mix.  Id. at 1005. 
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Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the U.S. Constitution allows law 
enforcement officers to restrain a female inmate while she is pregnant, in 
labor, or during postpartum recovery.”  Id. at 1243. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that this constitutional question 
stems from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Id. at 1249.  The court stated that, under the Eighth 
Amendment, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) exposed her to 
a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) was deliberately indifferent to 
her constitutional rights.”  Id.  The court stated that “[w]ithout more than 
a broad assertion about the penological interest in restraining all inmates—
even one who is in labor—a reasonable jury could find that” policies 
authorizing the restraint of pregnant inmates could lead “to a substantial 
and unjustified risk of harm.”  Id. at 1255–56.   The court further stated 
that, “a jury could find [law enforcement officers] were deliberately 
indifferent to any risk created by the restraints used on [a pregnant female 
inmate].”   Id. at 1257. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that whether such action is 
constitutionally permissible “depends on factual disputes a properly 
instructed jury must resolve.”  Id. at 1243. 
 
Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 840 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether equitable tolling applies to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).  Id. at 1156. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the case law from other circuits is 
conflicting and most circuits have declined to rule on whether equitable 
tolling applies to the FAA.  Id.  The court reasoned that the text, structure 
and purpose of the FAA are consistent with equitable tolling.  Id. at 1157.  
The court considered whether a limitations period is set forth in “unusually 
emphatic form,” is “unusually generous,” or uses “highly detailed” and 
“technical” language, and whether the statute “reiterated the limitations 
period several times in several different ways,” to determine whether 
Congress intended equitable tolling to apply.  Id.  The court reasoned that 
the structure and purpose of the FAA is not incompatible with equitable 
tolling.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the FAA is subject to 
equitable tolling.  Id. at 1156. 
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Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether an ineligible alien who fraudulently enters the 
[Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”)] is bound by the VWP’s limitations, 
including its waiver of any challenge to deportation other than asylum.”  
Id. at 1080. 
ANALYSIS:  The court first noted that the 2nd, 7th, and 8th Circuits 
have held that “the VWP limitations apply to those admitted under the 
program without being eligible.”  Id.  The 9th Circuit explained that other 
circuits relied on a regulation issued by the Attorney General pursuant to 
the statute enacting the VWP to fill a gap regarding fraudulent entrants.  
Id.  The court noted that this regulation contained a rule that “those who 
‘present[] fraudulent or counterfeit travel documents’ will be removed 
‘without referral of the alien to an immigration judge,’ unless the alien 
‘applies for asylum.’”  Id.  (internal citations omitted).  The court then 
explained that, after applying a level of deference appropriate under 
Chevron, there was “no real issue concerning the validity of the regulation 
interpreting the statute.”  Id. at 1080. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an “alien signing the VWP 
forms gives up any right to challenge removal, except on asylum grounds, 
if [the alien] overstays the grant of time permitted by the VWP.”  Id. 
 
Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether California’s 10-day wait to take possession of 
a firearm violates Second Amendment rights when applied to subsequent 
purchasers who pass the background check in less than ten days.”  Id. at 
827. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[t]he waiting period does not 
prevent any individuals from owning a firearm,” nor does the regulation 
“prevent, restrict or place any conditions on how guns are stored or used 
after a purchaser takes possession.”  Id. The court noted that intermediate 
scrutiny was appropriate and proceeded to apply the two-step analysis. Id.  
The 9th Circuit stated that the first step was satisfied because the parties 
agreed that safety and minimizing gun violence are important objectives.  
Id.  The court reasoned that the regulation reasonably achieved the 
government’s objectives because a “cooling-off period would serve to 
discourage . . . conduct and would impose no serious burden on the core 
Second Amendment right of defense of the home . . . .”  Id. at 828.  The 
9th Circuit further reasoned that the purpose of the regulation is public 
safety and “[t]he waiting period provides time not only for background 
checks, but for the purchaser to reflect on what he or she is doing, and, 
perhaps, for second thoughts that might prevent gun violence.”  Id. at 829. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that ‘[t]he State has established 
that there is a reasonable fit between important safety objectives and the 
application of the WPLs,” and, as such, the 10-day wait does not violate 
the Second Amendment.  Id. 
 
Tellez v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether “[a]n alien [has] ‘reentered’ the United States 
for purposes of reinstating a removal order, . . . when she was previously 
removed at a border crossing checkpoint.”  Id. at 1177. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that the relevant 
statute states that “[i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien has 
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having 
departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal 
is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or 
reviewed . . . and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any 
time after the reentry.”  Id.  The court reasoned that even if the alien was 
promptly removed at her first entry attempt into the United States, that the 
alien’s second attempt to enter the United States qualifies as “reentry.”  Id. 
at 1178.  The court acknowledged that historically, the definition of 
“entry” under 9th Circuit precedent was narrower, having “not been 
accomplished until physical presence is accompanied by freedom from 
official restraint.” Id.  The court distinguished this precedent by limiting 
the definition of “reentry” only “to the reinstatement provision’s definition 
of ‘reentry.’”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that when “an alien is issued an 
expedited removal order at a U.S. border-crossing checkpoint, that alien 
has entered the United States for the purpose of the reinstatement 
provision’s ‘reentry’ requirement.”  Id. at 1177. 
 
United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the reuse of single-use plastic needle guides 
during prostate biopsy exams can be criminally prosecuted under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 331(k).  Id. 
at 1208. 
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that the case turned “on the 
interpretation of ‘held for sale’” under [the statute], and, specifically, 
whether a doctor’s use of a device in the course of treating a patient be 
considered a ‘sale’ under the  statute[.]”  Id.  The court then noted that 
Congress intended to “protect consumers from dangerous products” until 
the products reach the “ultimate consumer,” patients.  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The 9th Circuit further rejected the argument that a single-use 
device cannot be “held for sale” because it is more appropriately 
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interpreted as being “held for use.”  Id. at 1209.  The court reasoned that 
“[a] single-use device is meant to be ‘consumed’ in the course of treating 
a patient—just like a drug.”  Id. at 1210.  The court then considered the 
commercial nature of a physician’s business, stating that “when a 
physician uses a disposable device on a patient, the device is ‘held for sale’ 
within the meaning of the FDCA, provided that there is a commercial 
relationship between the doctor and the patient and that the device is one 
that is meant to be ‘consumed’ in the process.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a “physician’s use of a 
consumable, single-use device on a paying patient satisfies the ‘held for 
sale’ element under 21 U.S.C. § 331(k),” and thus can be criminally 
prosecuted under the FDCA.   Id. at 1211. 
 
United States v. Kaplan, 839 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether to use fair market value or replacement value 
of destroyed property when calculating a restitution award.  Id. at 800. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the purpose of the Mandatory 
Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is to fully compensate victims for their 
losses, and to restore victims to their original state prior to the criminal act.  
Id.  The court further noted that the Supreme Court has held “that the 
ordinary meaning of ‘restitution’ is restoring someone to a position he 
occupied before a particular event.”  Id. at 801. 
CONCLUSION: While fair market value generally provides the best 
measure to ensure that restitution is the full amount, replacement value is 
an appropriate measure of destroyed property under the MVRA when the 
fair market value is either difficult to determine or would be an inadequate 
measure of the value necessary to make the victim whole.  Id. at 802. 
 
United States SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether Rule 13a-14 of the Securities Exchange 
Act “includes an implicit truthfulness requirement.”   Id. at 1112. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Rule 13a-14 was enacted under the 
authority of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which includes 
provisions that require companies to make filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) that are not misleading.  Id. at 1113.  The 
court further noted that it has previously held other similarly drafted 
provisions in the Securities Exchange Act to include an implicit 
truthfulness requirement.  Id.  Additionally, the 9th Circuit noted that other 
circuit courts “have also read rules promulgated under § 13 to create 
liability for false statements even when the rules did not explicitly require 
truthfulness.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange Act carries an implicit 
truthfulness requirement.  Id. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether under Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 304 
(“SOX 304”), CEOs or CFOs are required “to have personally engaged in 
misconduct before they are required to disgorge profits.”  Id. at 1114. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that, while no circuit court had 
addressed the issue, “most district courts to have examined it have 
concluded that SOX 304 does not require CEOs or CFOs to have 
personally engaged in misconduct before they are required to disgorge 
profits under that statute.”  Id. at 1115.  The court noted that this finding 
is consistent with the plain language of the statute and its legislative 
history.  Id. at 1114–15.  The court further reasoned that the language of 
the statute suggested, “that it is the issuer’s misconduct that matters, and 
not the personal misconduct of the CEO or CFO.”  Id. at 1114. 
CONCLUSION: SOX 304 does not require CEOs or CFOs to have 
engaged in personal misconduct to entitle the SEC to seek disgorgement.  
Id. at 1116. 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
General Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 1178 (10th 
Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the immunity provision of 47 U.S.C. § 230 
“provides immunity from suit . . . such that a denial would permit an 
interlocutory appeal”.  Id. at 1181. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by explaining that the Communication 
Decency Act (CDA) was enacted to shield children from Internet content 
that is sexually explicit.  Id.  Section 230, however, was enacted because 
of a recognition that tort-based lawsuits pose a threat to freedom of speech 
on the Internet.  Id.  Defendants asserted that the statutory language of 
§ 230 should be read to imply that CDA immunity bars suit as well as 
liability under that statute.  Id.  The court noted, however, that “reading 
the text in its entirety reveals that [§ 230] is merely a preemption 
provision . . . [and] does not contain an explicit bar to suit.”  Id. at 1182.  
The court reasoned that despite the Defendants’ arguments, the statutory 
language must contain an explicit guarantee of immunity and, without one, 
no such finding of immunity from suit can be found.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that because § 230 of the CDA 
does not contain an explicit grant of immunity from suit, no such finding 
of immunity could be implied from the statutory language.  Id. 
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George v. Urban Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether a plausible promissory estoppel claim arises 
when a party demonstrates a defendant’s “unambiguous promises to 
provide permanent [Home affordable Modification Program (HAMP)] 
loan modifications for eligible borrowers.”  Id. at 1257. 
ANALYSIS:  The 10th Circuit addressed the lower court’s suggestion 
of “the existence of a circuit split on this issue.”  Id. at 1259.  The 10th 
Circuit noted that “our examination of the cases the district court relied on 
reveals that other circuits have declined to find clear and unambiguous 
promises when considering documents or circumstances that differ 
significantly from those [in the other circuits].”  Id.  The 10th Circuit 
joined the 1st, 7th, and 9th Circuits in finding the first element of a 
plausible promissory estoppel claim.  Id. at 1260. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit ultimately rejected the district 
court’s acknowledgment of a circuit split, and joined all other courts that 
have addressed this issue in concluding that a “document [which] clearly 
and unambiguously promises to provide permanent HAMP loan 
modifications to borrowers” is sufficient to allege a promise for a 
promissory estoppel claim.  Id. at 1260. 
 
Kingsbury v. Westlake Mgmt. Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23416 (10th 
Cir. December 30, 2016) 
QUESTION ONE: Which limitations period the Oklahoma courts 
would apply to an action to satisfy a judgment against one of the partners 
in a partnership for the partnership’s liability.  Id. at *6. 
ANALYSIS:  The court began its analysis by noting that the complaint 
contains “no allegations of individual wrongdoing, nor does the complaint 
identify the individual conduct of either [partner] as a basis for personal 
liability.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Rather, the 
complaint “merely [sought] to impose liability on [the partners] for 
partnership debt by operation of Oklahoma statute.”  Id. (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION: “The Oklahoma courts would apply the five-year 
statute of limitations governing a suit for debt.”  Id. 
QUESTION TWO: When the Oklahoma courts would deem that 
limitations period to have commenced.  Id. at *6. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by stating that “the 
Oklahoma statutes make clear that a “judgment against a partnership is not 
by itself a judgment against a partner.”  Id.  As such, a creditor’s rights 
against a partner do not arise when a partnership incurs an obligation.  Id. 
at *7. 
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CONCLUSION: Oklahoma courts would “define accrual as occurring 
when those rights arise.”  Id. 
QUESTION THREE: Whether Oklahoma partnership law compels a 
contrary conclusion.  Id. at *6. 
ANALYSIS:  The court reasoned that Oklahoma law “affords would-
be plaintiffs the option of suing in the same action or in separate actions,” 
and, as such, “suggests the Legislature considers the collection action to 
be separate from the underlying litigation.”  Id. at *7.  Further, the court 
noted that Oklahoma law “merely mandates that before the creditor 
attempts to satisfy an obligation of the partnership against the assets of the 
partners, he must first obtain a judgment against the partnership based on 
the same claim, and unsuccessfully attempt to satisfy that judgment against 
partnership assets.”  Id. at *9.  As such, the statute by its plain language 
“does not dictate that the action against the partners be for the exact same 
claim; all that is required is that it be based on the same claim.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: Oklahoma partnership law did not prevent the second 
action because the decedent’s son obtained, in the negligence action, the 
requisite judgment based on the same claim.  Id. at *8 (internal quotations 
omitted and emphasis in original). 
 
United States v. Miller, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22433 (10th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether to resolve on the merits a § 2255 motion 
that hinges on an issue that will be resolved in the near future by the 
Supreme Court, but in all likelihood not soon enough to benefit the 
defendant seeking relief.”  Id. at *7–8. 
ANALYSIS: Defendant argued that he was entitled to a significantly 
lower sentence because his initial sentence was based on the application 
of a rule that was rendered invalid by a subsequent Supreme Court 
decision.  Id. at *2.  The district court elected a stay order until another 
relevant case was decided.  Id. at *3.  Defendant argued that the stay order, 
in effect, operated as a final dismissal of his claim.  Id. at *3–4.  The court 
reasoned that “staying resolution of his motion until the Supreme Court 
resolves [the issue] will irreparably damage Miller by resulting in his 
unnecessary confinement.”  Id. at *7.  As such, the court reasoned that a 
stay amounted to an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court.  
Id.  Even though the Supreme Court would likely resolve the issue in the 
near future, the court noted that it was not likely to happen “soon enough 
to benefit the defendant seeking relief.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that defendant’s right to issuance of 
the writ was clear and indisputable because, without it, he would 
effectively be denied his right to timely resolution of his § 2255 motion.  
Id. at *8. 
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United States v. Supreme Court, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18543 (10th 
Cir. Oct. 13, 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether New Mexico’s Rule 16-308(E) provisions may 
survive a preemption challenge considering the federal grand jury law.  Id. 
at 923. 
ANALYSIS: New Mexico’s Rule 16-308(E) “prohibits a prosecutor 
from subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence about a past or present 
client in a grand-jury or other criminal proceeding unless such evidence is 
‘essential’ and ‘there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the 
information.”  Id. at 893.  The court reasoned the “Anglo-American legal 
tradition and the Constitution itself” carve out a unique position for the 
federal grand jury system.  Id. at 923.  The court noted the Framers 
designed such a system to ensure a neutral process to ascertain truth and 
justice, apart from the three branches of government.   Id.  The court 
further reasoned that any such conflict with the federal law “would impede 
the grand jury’s broad investigative mandate—which the Framers 
specifically envisioned in enacting the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 928. 
CONCLUSION:  The 10th Circuit held “Rule 16-308(E)’s challenged 
provisions are conflict-preempted in the grand-jury setting because the 
essentiality and no-other-feasible-alternative requirements pose an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of the federal legal regime governing grand-jury practice.”  Id. 
at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 834 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether a seaman’s work in international waters on a 
cruise ship that travels to foreign ports constitutes 
“performance . . . abroad” under the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 202.  
Id. at 1203. 
ANALYSIS: Section 202 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards only allows for 
arbitration agreements between United States citizens when the 
contractual relationship between the parties envisages performance 
abroad.  Id. at 1203.  The crux of the dispute was the determination of what 
was the proper definition of the term “envisages performance . . . aboard.”  
Id. at 1204. Plaintiff argued “abroad” means “in one or more foreign 
states,” while Defendant argued that abroad means “anywhere outside a 
country.”  Id.  The court found flaws in both party’s definitions.  Id. at 
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1205.  Ultimately, the court ruled that because Plaintiff worked on a cruise 
ship that traveled in international waters to foreign ports, his contract 
“envisaged performance abroad,” thus the arbitration clause was found to 
be enforceable under the Convention.  Id. at 1204. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “performance abroad” 
includes a seaman’s work traveling to or from a foreign country.  Id. at 
1204. 
 
Gelin v. United States, AG, 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: “Whether ‘abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult’ 
is a crime involving moral turpitude.”  Id. at 1243. 
ANALYSIS: In addressing whether a crime involves moral turpitude, 
the 11th Circuit first determined whether a categorical approach or 
modified categorical approach is appropriate.  Id. at 1241.  The categorical 
approach “consider[s] only the fact of conviction and the statutory 
definition of the offense, rather than the specific facts underlying the 
defendant’s case.”  Id.  The 11th Circuit further reasoned that “a person 
who knowingly or willfully abuses an elderly person or disabled adult 
without causing great bodily harm” constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  Id. at 1242.  The 11th Circuit stated that this act “qualifies as a 
[crime involving moral turpitude] because of (1) the culpable state of mind 
required by the statute, and (2) the particularly vulnerable nature of the 
victims.”  Id. at 1243. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “a conviction for abuse of 
an elderly person or disabled adult . . . is categorically a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”  Id. at 1247–48. 
 
United States v. Phillips, 834 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether “the police [can] arrest someone based solely 
on a civil writ of bodily attachment for unpaid child support[.]”  Id. at 
1178. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “a court will issue a writ of bodily 
attachment for unpaid child support if it determines, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that a person is liable for civil contempt.”  Id. at 1180–81.  
The court explained that the Fourth Amendment requires only probable 
cause in order to issue a warrant for a civil or criminal offense and that 
writs of bodily attachment are, therefore, subject to a higher standard for 
issuance.  Id. at 1181.  The court further reasoned that writs for bodily 
attachment are warrants in the historical sense in that they require a 
person’s arrest and production before the court.  Id.  The court finally noted 
the close analogy between writs for bodily attachment and bench 
warrants—which are also based on civil offenses—and noted that bench 
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warrants have long been held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment by the 
courts.  Id. at 1182. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a “writ of bodily 
attachment for unpaid child support is a warrant for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”  Id. 
 
